Neoliberal policies of the last 30 years have seen income inequality grow and the collapse of consumer spending (C) the main driver of any domestic economy. There has been an increase in the proportion of income accruing to assets which worsens inequality in many countries. While China’s economy is synonymous with exports, private consumption has been the largest component of Chinese GDP growth since 2014. With household spending at 39% of GDP in 2018, compared with nearer 70% for more developed economies such as the U.S. and the U.K., it also has considerable potential for further growth. Remember that Aggregate Demand = C+I+G+(X-M).
At the annual planning meeting last month China decided to focus on expanding domestic demand and achieving a major breakthroughs in core technologies. President Xi Jinping’s administration is looking at being self-sufficient in a range of technologies that have in the past been dominated by US firms. An obvious reason for the switch to domestic consumers is that with COVID-19 there is increasing instability and uncertainty around the international environment. A temporarily suspended trade war with the US has emphasised the importance of ending its dependence on foreign technology supplies. President Xi Jinping outlined a new dual circulation economic strategy which came about with the potential decoupling with the US and deglobalisation which would negatively impact the demand for Chinese exports. The dual circulation economic strategy consists of:
The importance of strengthening domestic demand
Technological innovation over closer integration with the outside world
Growth targets China has set targets for economic growth in its 5 year plans – this is its 14th 5 year plan. It is expected that annual average growth to be around 5% down from previous years where it was expected to be 6.5% – 7.5%.
Final thought China needs a lot more domestic consumption as newly produced goods will just become surplus to requirements. This will also mean increased levels of corporate debt.
I have blogged quite a bit on this topic using the work of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto and his book ‘The Mystery of Capital’. There was also some great footage from the Commanding Heights Series which showed de Soto traveling in Peru and talking about what he sees as the main obstacle to the development of markets and capitalism within developing countries – property rights.
Without a title to a property nobody knows who owns what or where, who is accountable for the performance of obligations, who is responsible for losses and fraud, or what mechanisms are available to enforce payment for services and goods delivered. Consequently, most potential assets in these countries have not been identified or realised; there is little accessible capital, and the exchange economy is constrained and sluggish. However in the West, where property rights and other legal documentation exist, assets take on a role of securing loans and credit for a variety of purposes – building capital with capital.
De Soto estimated that about 85% of urban parcels in Third World and former communist nations, and between 40 and 53 % of rural parcels, are held in such a way that they cannot be used to create capital. The total value of the real estate held but not legally owned by the poor of these countries is at least $9.3 trillion – $13.5trn in today’s money. Studies suggest that titling has boosted agricultural productivity, especially in Asia and Latin America. The World Bank wants 70% of people to have secure property rights by 2030. Despite all these efforts, only 30% of the world’s people have formal titles today. In rural sub-Saharan Africa a dismal 10% do. Just 22% of countries, including only 4% of African ones, have mapped and registered the private land in their capital cities.
PRINDEX is an organisation that measures global perceptions of land and property rights – see video below.
In July 2020 they published an informative report on tenure security – “Comparative Report – A global assessment of perceived tenure security from 140 countries”. Some of the findings from the report:
Nearly 1 billion people around the world consider it likely or very likely that they will be evicted from their land or property in the next five years. This represents nearly 1 in 5 adults in the 140 countries surveyed.
Levels of perceived insecurity vary by region. While the greatest number of people who are insecure live South Asia (22% of people), sub-Saharan Africa (26%) and the Middle East and North Africa (28%) each have higher proportions of insecurity.
People living in cities experience higher levels of insecurity than those living in rural areas (18% vs. 16%).
The possession of formal land and property rights documentation tends to be associated with greater confidence of perceived tenure security compared to owners and renters who have no formal documentation at all (80% vs. 63%)
Nearly half of all women in sub-Saharan Africa (48%) feel insecure about their land and property rights when faced with the prospect of widowhood or divorce.
Tenure insecurity is strongly linked to age. Overall, 24% of young people aged 18-25 felt insecure compared to just 11% of people aged over 65.
Tenure insecurity is associated with economic factors in regions that are highly developed, such as North America, Europe, Australasia and parts of Asia.
Perceived tenure insecurity is closely correlated with other economic, human development, and governance indicators, including gross domestic product (GDP), World Governance Indicators (WGI), the Multidimensional Poverty Index, and the Human Development Index. There is a particularly strong correlation between tenure insecurity and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
Below is a graph from the report:
Perceived tenure insecurity as measured across all properties and plots of land that a respondent has rights to access or use, not just their ‘main’ property.
In the developing world having the authority to allocate land has great benefits.
Politicians use land as a way of rewarding supporters and themselves
Politicians / Chiefs use their powers to sell the land to mining companies / developers without the consent of their people
Some seize the land because it is deemed to be in the “public interest”
A crucial lesson of the past few decades, however, is that if land reform is treated purely as a top-down technical task, it will not work well. It is not enough simply to map and register a property, as several high-profile efforts show. Land is an emotive issue, especially where memories of colonial expropriation still linger. As Mr de Soto argued, capitalism should be for the many, not just the few.The Economist – September 12th 2020
Although a few years old now the video below is a good example of dumping – where the exporting country is able to lower its prices below that of the domestic price in the market it is selling into. Useful to show when teaching barriers to trade.
The U.S. spends approximately $37 billion dollars a year on foreign aid – just under 1% of our federal budget. “The Foreign Aid Paradox” zeroes in on food aid to Haiti and how it affects American farming and shipping interests as well as Haiti’s own agricultural markets. The fact that the US dump rice exports on the Haitian market below the equilibrium price severely affects the revenue of local farmers. Should there be a trade-not-aid strategy for developing countries? Below is a very good video from wetheeconomy
The trade-not-aid strategy is based on the idea that if developing countries were able to trade more freely with wealthy countries, they would have more reliable incomes and they would be much less dependent on external aid to carry out development projects. International trade would raise incomes and living standards as poor countries would be able to export their way to economic development by selling their products to rich countries eager to buy their goods.
Emerging economies have been affected in numerous ways by Covid-19. The following are just some:
Limited movement of their population
loss of export earnings
drop in foreign direct investment
fall in remittances.
Regarding the last one – the World Bank have estimated that global remittances will decline by 20% in 2020 – more than US$100bn – due to the Covid-19 pandemic and shutdown. There are expected to fall across the regions – see graph below:
In 2019 remittances reached a record US$554 billion but are estimated to be US$445bn in 2020. With the fall in foreign direct investment they have become even more important to low and middle income countries (LMIC). In 2019 remittances were greater than foreign direct investment and were the biggest source of capital in LMIC – 8.9% of GDP. This is especially prevalent when you consider that FDI is expected to plunge by more than 35% to LMIC in 2020.
The importance of remittances is also significant when pooling a poverty figures – it is estimated that a 10% increase in remittances reduces poverty by 3%.
A fall in remittances means:
less spending the economy as a whole
more people below the poverty line
more people unable to afford food, healthcare and basic needs
The World Bank estimate that in 2019 there were 272m international migrants of which 26m were refugees. As well there were in 700m migrants within a country providing financial support elsewhere. However with a downturn in the economy due to Covid-19 it is the foreign workers who are first to lose their job. 2021 might see a slight recovery with remittances set to rise by 5.6% to US$470bn but many things can eventuate over the next year.
In the majority of economics textbooks a depreciation of the exchange is beneficial to an economy especially those like developing countries which depend a lot on export revenue.
A fall in the value of the exchange rate will make exports cheaper and so acts as an implicit subsidy to firms that sell abroad. Exposure to world markets also helps companies in the developing world learn and improve.Finished imported products that are still purchased will be more expensive and some of these will count in the country’s consumer price index. Costs of production will be pushed up because the cost of imported raw materials will rise. Domestic firms may also feel less competitive pressure to keep costs and prices low.
A rise in the value of exchange rate will make exports more expensive in terms of foreign currencies, and imports cheaper in terms of the domestic currency. Such a change is likely to result in a fall in demand for domestic products. A higher exchange rate may also reduce inflationary pressure by shifting the aggregate supply curve to the right because of lower costs of imported raw materials. The price of imported finished products would also fall and there would be increased competitive pressure on domestic firms to restrict price rises in order to try to maintain their sales at home and abroad.
It has been traditional for developing countries to try and engineer a weaker currency to make their exports more competitive especially as this revenue is one way in which their economies can start to grow. China and other South East Asian economies adopted this strategy as they went through industrialising their economy. Empirical studies suggest that an undervalued currency boosts growth more in developing rather than developed economies.
Why then is it that some African countries still want to maintain a strong currency? Primary sector exports and overseas aid raises the demand for local currencies making them appreciate. Governments are concerned about a weaker currency as
Some are dependent on capital imports to finance infrastructure projects
It forces them to spend more income to pay back foreign debts.
Pushes up the cost of imported goods, including food, medicine and fuel – mainly impacts the city population who are more likely to complain to politicians.
Some companies in developing countries import a lot of their machinery and raw materials – additional cost to their production.
A weaker currency does make exports cheaper but this can be nullified by more expensive imports.
However all of this has been overshadowed by COVID-19. The pandemic is increasingly a concern for developing countries which rely heavily on imports to meet their needs of medical supplies essential to combat the virus.
Here are some FT journalists answering questions around the impact of green policies on the growth of developing countries. The main points are:
Under the Paris climate agreement there is currently no obligation for developing countries to implement green policies.
It is unfair for developed economies to ask developing countries to stop their oil and gas industry when they themselves has accrued the benefits of energy extraction.
China has invested hugely in solar energy – this is seen as the next industrial revolution
Over last decade China has committed over $780bn to wind and solar energy
In 2019 29 countries spent $1bn or more on renewable energy – indicative of it becoming cheaper.
Developing countries bigger spenders than Developed countries
Developed countries were the first to embrace non- hydro renewables, back in the last decade, offering subsidies to encourage deployment. However, the sharpest increases in electricity demand, by far, are taking place in developing countries. The figure below shows that up to 2014, the majority of renewable energy capacity investment was in the developed world, but that every year since then, emerging economies have been dominant. In 2018, developed economies invested $125.8 billion, some 10% more than in the previous year, while developing countries committed $147.1 billion, down 24%. However, the different shades of green in the chart reveal that the latter change was entirely due to China and India. Investment in those two giants, taken together, fell 36% to $99.6 billion, while that in “other developing economies” rose 22% to a record $47.5 billion.
Developed vs Developing Countries – Investment in renewable energy 2004-2018 $bn
Source: Frankfurt School – UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance. Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2019
Below is a graph from the FT site that shows growth rates in leading developing countries and it makes a good comparison with the Eurozone and the World. Some emerging economies have, nevertheless, achieved high economic growth rates in recent years. China has witnessed particularly rapid economic growth and has become the second largest economy in the world behind the US. China’s increase in output has been driven by increases in investment and exports. This has been helped by a fall in the renminbi which makes Chinese exports cheaper. India’s growth rates has also been significant because of an increase in the labour force and advances in IT. Remember that ‘economic development’ is the process of improving people’s economic well-being and quality of life whilst economic growth is an increase in an economy’s output and the economic growth rate is the annual percentage change in output.
Ghana and Ivory Coast produce nearly 2/3 of the global supply of cocoa. Most of the 2m cocoa farmers in west Africa are smallholders and therefore have little influence on the world price. Why is it so difficult for poor countries to command higher prices for cocoa and controlling more valuable areas of the supply chain?
Ghana – supplies 20% of all cocoa beans – earns $2bn a year which is less than 2% of the value of chocolate that is manufactured, branded and sold. It seems that cocoa producers are in a colonial style relationship with chocolate manufacturers.
Chocolate – $100bn industry and Ghana and Ivory Coast who produce 65% of the raw material only earn $6bn – see image below. But why couldn’t these two countries have earned more money by processing the cocoa into liquor, cocoa butter or chocolate. One reason is the electricity costs and the industry likes to keep most of the added value near the western markets that it serves.
Opec to Copec
From October 2020 Ghana and Ivory Coast will have a fixed premium of $400 a tonne over the benchmark futures price. Opec controls 30-40% of global oil supply and have a significant role in influencing prices. Ghana’s vice-president Mahamudu Bawumia refers to this in the cocoa industry as Copec. The premium known as the ‘living income differential’ (LID) is intended to increase farm-gate prices so that farmers can have a much higher standard of living than they presently have. However unlike oil wells, cocoa trees cannot simply be turned off to reduce supply. Even if prices go up, say traders, that will encourage farmers to grow more which will increase supply and reduce the price.
Being a bigger part of the supply chain. As well as seeking higher cocoa prices, Ghana wants to add value to its product and give tax breaks to chocolate manufacturers to grind cocoa beans domestically. However there are issues:
mechanised factories employ few people so tax breaks have a low return
Ghana has a small dairy industry forcing manufacturers to import
Electricity prices are high
The climate requires greater refrigeration which means costs go up
Costs are always going to be more in Ghana than in Europe – also manufacturers are closer to their market in Europe. If consumers want to help poor farmers trading houses and big companies need to be cut out of the loop. At the moment there is a monopsony market.
The primary sector is seen as integral to assisting developing countries grow and raise their standard of living. For the Mozambican economy the cashew industry is an example of this – more than 40% of Mozambican farmers grow and sell cashew, and the processing sector provides formal employment to more than 8,000 individuals. Mozambique is currently the second largest producer in East and Southern Africa and has links with premium export markets, including the United States and Europe.
In the 1960’s the cashew nut industry in Mozambique was in good shape supplying over 50% of global supply and processed most of these domestically and thereby adding employment. However, with a civil war and the instruction from the World Bank in the 1990’s to remove controls and cut taxes on the exports of raw nuts, trading firms shipped out cashews and processed them overseas with significant job losses. But an about turn by the government in 2001 has seen:
an export tax of 18-22% for raw nuts
a 0% tax for processed kernels.
a ban on exports during the first few months of the harvest
16 factories employing 17,000 people, which process about half the cashews sold.
However by having less competition amongst processors – a little like a monopsony market – farmers selling raw cashew nuts are finding that the price of their crop is being reduced by the smaller number of processors. Most cashew nut farmers are smallholders and the government seems to be oblivious to the 1.3m families for the sake of protecting processing jobs.
Monopsony – one buyer many sellers – other examples include: – large supermarkets, who can dictate terms to smaller suppliers. – buyers of labour in the labour market.
There is a dilemma for developing countries as when a primary industry starts to expand into the secondary stage of processing, government protection can hurt nut-growers. Just like the coffee industry farmers are at the mercy of a small number of middlemen in this case the processors monopsony power.
Source: Mozambique’s nut factories have made a cracking comeback – The Economist 12th September 2019
A significant number of developing countries are located in and around the equator which also means that they are more exposed to the extremes of climate change. As the world gets hotter these countries will suffer the most which makes their ability to advance their standard of living even harder. Temperatures in tropical climates will become far more variable and soil near the equator will dry up reducing its ability to dampen temperature swings e.g. Amazon rainforest, Congo, Indonesia etc.
The additional cost to poor countries in avoiding the damage caused by climate change is estimated to be between US$140bn – US$300bn each year on measures such as costal defences, strengthening buildings etc. This is according to the UN Environment Programme which assumes that global temperatures will be only 2°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century – unlikely according to The Economist. Not only are these countries suffering from climate change‑related drought, which will lead to a consequent drop in agricultural production and rise in food insecurity, but it also means higher interest payments than similar countries that are less exposed to climate change.
The V20 countries The Vulnerable Twenty (V20) Group of Ministers of Finance of the Climate Vulnerable Forum is a dedicated cooperation initiative of economies systemically vulnerable to climate change. The call to create the V20 originated from the Climate Vulnerable Forum’s Costa Rica Action Plan (2013-2015) in a major effort to strengthen economic and financial responses to climate change. Originally 20 countries it has now expanded to 48 and the membership is mostly from poor countries that make up less than 5% of global GDP. They include the following:
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Haïti, Honduras, Kenya, Kiribati, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Palau, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Senegal, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam and Yemen.
Research has estimated that V20 countries pay 1.2% higher than comparable countries which raises the V20’s borrowing costs by about 10% which is equivalent to an extra US$4bn each year in interest payments. It has also been estimated that of corporate debt a significant amount is held by countries who are the most at risk of climate change. This equates to 3% of total debt in more than 60,000 firms in 80 countries. These high risk countries were charged 0.83% higherinterest on loans which equates to roughly a 10% premium. Therefore credit rating agencies are including climate change in their risk models and what makes it worse for developing countries is that they tend to be primary based economies which are the most susceptible to climate change. Moody’s, the credit rating agency, has suggested that of the 37 countries that are most vulnerable, farming accounts for 44% of employment on average.
For developing countries to counter the impacts of climate change sovereign parametric insurance has been prevalent. This insurance is pooled amongst countries in close proximity and makes the premium more affordable. This insurance relies on risk modeling rather than on-the-ground damage assessments to estimate the cost of disasters. Parametric insurance policies pay out automatically when certain pre-agreed conditions, such as wind speed, rainfall or modeled economic losses, meet or exceed a given threshold. Examples of areas where countries have pooled insurance are:
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
African Risk Capacity
Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company
Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Insurance Facility – under development
Like any insurance although it might be under used it does mean that countries can access money to recover and rebuild their economies – ideally with greater resilience.
Source: The Economist – ‘Costing the earth’ – 17th August 2019