Below is a useful diagram from McKinsey & Company that compares the money used to assist the economies after the outbreak of Covid-19 and the GFC in 2017. Governments allocated US$10 trillion for economic stimulus in just two months—and for some countries, their response as a percentage of GDP was nearly ten times what it was in the financial crisis of 2008–09.
Countries in Europe have allocated around US$4 trillion which is approximately 30 times than that of the Marshall Plan in today’s value – the Marshall Plan was valued at $15bn in 1948. The size of government responses are unprecedented and they, with central banks, are moving into new territory. Global debt is estimated to reach US$300 trillion by the March quarter in 2021 with global GDP taking a huge hit. However unlike the GFC there seems to be an end point once an effective vaccine has been found but many jobs and businesses have gone and it will take time before new ones appear.
I have blogged quite a bit on this topic and refer back to a very good video clip from PBS Newshour on how the Chinese authorities influenced the value of the yuan back in 2010.
Basically at 9.15am the Peoples Bank of China (Central Bank) and the SAFE (State Administration for Foreign Exchange) issues a circular to all the trading banks stating that this is the exchange of the Renminbi to the US$ for today. When companies sell goods overseas the US$ etc that they acquire are then exchanged for Renminbi with the Central Bank – therefore the Central Bank accumulates significant amounts of US$.
Today it could be said that China has done well economically relative to other countries largely due to its large trade surplus. However one would think that with a large trade surplus the yuan would increase in value as there is a greater demand for the currency in order to buy China’s exports. This raises the question as to whether China has been manipulated its currency in order to maintain its competitive edge in the export market.
When a country’s currency is getting too strong the governments/central banks sells its own currency and buys foreign currency – usually US$.
When a country’s currency is getting too weak the governments/central banks sells its foreign currency – usually US$- and buys its own currency.
For two decades until mid-2014 China’s prodigious accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves was the clear by-product of actions to restrain the yuan, as the central bank bought up cash flowing into the country. A sharp drop in reserves in 2015-16 was evidence of its intervention on the other side, propping up the yuan when investors rushed out. Since then, China’s reserves have been uncannily steady. This year they have risen by just 1%. Taken at face value, the central bank seems to have refrained from intervening. That is certainly what it wants to convey, regularly describing supply and demand for the yuan as “basically balanced”. Source: The Economist – “Caveat victor” – October 31st 2020
With the surge in China’s trade surplus the yuan has remained fairly stable and with this you would expect that there would be an increase in foreign exchange reserves with Chinese authorities buying foreign exchange with yuan.
A couple reasons why this may not be the case:
Commercial banks foreign assets have increased by US$125bn since April. The commercial banks are state owned so it is plausible that the government has used them as a substitute. Adding these foreign reserves to the offical figures suggests invention to keep the yuan at an artificially lower rate. There is the possibility that the central bank has special trading accounts at the state banks. Also exporters have wanted to keep their US$ as they are worried that the disharmony with the US could damage the yuan.
The central bank made it cheaper to short the yuan in forward trades – shorting a currency means that the trader believes that the currency will go down compared to another currency.
Chinese officials want the yuan to be volatile but within a narrow range in order to convince other countries that they are not intervening whilst persuading people in the market that they will intervene if necessary.
Caught between a rock and a hard place
The Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) are trying to protect domestic producers by keeping a weak yuan so to make Chinese products attractive to overseas buyers. At the same time they are trying to prevent domestic capital from flowing too quickly out of China to stronger currencies. However a longer term scenario is that China would like the yuan to be more prevalent as a currency in the global market. The yuan currently accounts for approximately 2% of global foreign exchange reserves, although by 2030 it is estimated that it will account for 5% to 10% of global foreign exchange reserve assets.
Source: The Economist – “Caveat victor” – October 31st 2020
Today central banks have a limited toolkit and the powers to deal with the savings glut (see image below), lack of investment, climate change and income inequality. There is a lot of money in the system but the velocity of circulation is slow – MV=PT – and this is one reason why we have little inflation.
Velocity of circulation of money is part of the the Monetarist explanation of inflation operates through the Fisher equation:
M x V = P x T
M = Stock of money V = Income Velocity of Circulation P = Average Price level T = Volume of Transactions or Output
Add to this COVID-19 and the impact it has had on especially developing economies and we have economic stagnation.
Some economists have suggested the need for more expansionary fiscal policy as well as structural reform to achieve economic growth. The latter being a long-term policy can take the form of price controls, management of public finances, financial sector reforms. labour market reforms etc. Although the US Federal Reserve is adopting a flexible average inflation target to avoid a disinflationary environment it will not be enough to deal with secular stagnation.
Secular stagnation Since the GFC in 2008 it is evident that low interest rates are the new normal and according to Larry Summers (former Treasury Secretary) we are in an era of secular stagnation. This refers to the fact that on average the ‘natural interest rate’ – the rate consistent with full employment – is very low. There can be periods of full employment but even with 0% interest rates private demand is insufficient to eliminate the output gap. The US was in a liquidity trap for eight of the past 12 years; Europe and Japan are still there, and the market now appears to believe that something like this is another the new normal.
Paul Krugman suggests that there are real doubts about unconventional monetary policy and that the stimulus for an economy should take the form of permanent public investment spending on both physical and human capital – infrastructure and health of the population. This spending would take the form of deficit-financed public investment. There has been the suggestion that deficit-financed public investment might lead to ‘crowding out’ private investment and also how is the debt repaid? Krugman came up with three offsetting factors
When the economy is in a liquidity trap, which now seems likely to be a large fraction of the time, the extra public investment will have a multiplier effect, raising GDP relative to what it would otherwise be. Based on the experience of the past decade, the multiplier would probably be around 1.5, meaning 3% higher GDP in bad times — and considerable additional revenue from that higher level of GDP. Permanent fiscal stimulus wouldn’t pay for itself, but it would pay for part of itself.
If the investment is productive, it will expand the economy’s productive capacity in the long run.This is obviously true for physical infrastructure and R&D, but there is also strong evidence that safety-net programmes for children make them healthier, more productive adults, which also helps offset their direct fiscal cost (Hoynes and Whitmore Schanzenbach 2018).
There’s fairly strong evidence of hysteresis — temporary downturns permanently or semi-permanently depress future output (Fatás and Summers 2015).
Source: “The Case for a permanent stimulus”. Paul Krugman cited in “Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes” Edited by Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro
Economic Rent and Transfer Earnings To most of us “rent” is defined as a periodical payment made for the use of a particular asset – usually a residential or commercial property. However, the concept is not limited to land or buildings because it can also be applied to the other factors of production. When a factor is earning more than its supply price, it is receiving a part of its income in the form of economic rent. This situation arises when demand increases and supply cannot fully respond to the increases in demand. For example, labour already employed will experience an increase in income so that they must be earning more than their supply prices.
Present Wages – Wages when initially employed = Economic Rent
The minimum payment required to prevent a person transferring to another employer or another occupation is know as transfer earnings. It is determined by what the factor could earn in its next best paid employment. Transfer earnings may be regarded as the opportunity cost of keeping an employee in their present job or it may be regarded as the employee’s supply price in their present occupation. For example, if the minimum weekly wage that would persuade someone to work as a shop attendant is $200 but he or she actually receives a wage of $250, then the transfer earnings amount is $200 and he or she is receiving $50 in the form of economic rent. Therefore, economic rent can be defined as any payment to a factor of production that is in excess of transfer earnings.
The graph below shows the demand and supply for labour. The equilibrium wage is $120 with a quantity of 50 units. Total earnings is equal to $120 x 50 units of labour = $6,000 and employees receive the same wage of $120. However, all workers except the last one taken into employment were prepared to offer their services at wages less than $120. Therefore, provided the supply of labour slopes upwards (i.e. it is less than perfectly inelastic) an increase in demand will give rise to rent payments to those factors that were already employed at the original wage of $120. The area of economic rent and transfer earnings is shown in the graph below. Only the last labour unit employed earns no economic rent because the wage of $120 is the supply price to that particular labour unit.
Inelastic and Elastic labour supply
The amount of economic rent and transfer earnings in the return to labour depends upon the elasticity of supply and the level of demand. The greater the occupational mobility of labour, the smaller the element of economic rent. If labour can do a variety of occupations then quite small changes in the wage rate will cause large movements of labour into an industry when wages rise, and out of that industry when wages fall.
Very specialised labour has an inelastic supply curve. This includes surgeons, top CEOs, scientists and jobs that require high skill levels or involve significant danger and skill, eg, deep sea divers. The relatively high rewards to this labour are due to the fact that they are in very scarce supply relative to the demands for their services. Their transfer earnings will be much less than their salary because the market values outside their own specialised professions are probably very low. A frequently quoted example of earnings that contain a large amount of economic rent are those of top sports people. Today these people can earn significant amounts of money in a short period of time. A footballer such as Christiano Ronaldo earns €326 923 per week because of his ability to attract big crowds, merchandise sales and sponsorship deals when he was at Real Madrid Football Club. His skill levels are unique and in very limited supply when considering other players. This reflects a very high marginal productivity leading to a higher wage.
Some other occupations that are held in high regard by society do not command such high salaries because of their low marginal productivity. This includes nurses, firefighters, teachers, etc. Furthermore, the supply of labour for these jobs tends to be elastic because there are many people to choose from, unlike their footballing counterparts who have unique skills.
Where the supply of labour is less than perfectly elastic an increase in demand will lead to some workers receiving economic rent. This rent may be of a temporary nature, however, because the higher wage may lead to an increase in supply, which in turn, lowers the wage. Increased wages might entice other workers to undertake the necessary training. The economic rent that is earned during the period before supply can be increased is referred to as quasi rent. True economic rent refers to the remuneration of factors that are fixed in supply.
Below is a useful flow diagram from the ANZ bank which adds Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) and Funding for Lending Programme (FLP) to the Official Cash Rate (OCR – Base Rate)
LSAP – this is the buying of up $100 billion of government bonds – quantitative easing FLP – this gives banks cheap lending based on the Official Cash Rate – could be about $28 billion based on take up OCR – wholesale interest rate currently at 0.25%. Commercial banks borrow at 0.5% above OCR and can save at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) at 1% below OCR.
With FLP and more LSAP this will mean lower lending rates and deposit rates. This should provide more stimulus in the economy and allay fears of future funding constraints making banks more confident about lending. Add to this a third stimulus – an OCR of 0.25%. The flow chart shows the impact that these three stimulus policies have on a variety of variables including – exchange rates – inflation -unemployment – consumer spending – investment – GDP. Very useful for a class discussion on the monetary policy mechanism.
Donald Trump’s subsidies to US farmers (see below) could be above what is allowed under international trade rules and it has been suggested that subsidies in 2020 will make up 36% of farm incomes.
US farm subsidies
2018 – US$12bn
2019 – US$16bn
This year US farm incomes are set to drop 15% even after the payment of subsidies and billions of dollars have been set aside to assist the farming sector. New Zealand officials are concerned that the subsidies given to US farmers will exceed the US$19billion which is the WTO’s limit. They want formal notification of payments in 2020 and how the US plans to reduce this assistance to farmers. The EU, China, India and China are asking similar questions of the US.
Subsidies distort trade and entice farmers to keep producing even though prices are falling – see graph . This output tends to be inefficiently produced and would not be competitive in a normal market free of subsidies.What the subsidies did in New Zealand was to encourage people to develop land that was not really suitable for any agricultural use. However as they got a subsidy from the government efficiency or quality didn’t feature as a major factor in maintaining competitiveness. With subsidies prices take longer to recover their former levels while excess supply is worked through as was the case in 2018 and 2019 when the EU dumped subsidised skim milk powder on the global market. But the support package to the US farmers is very significant and has the potential to negatively impact those countries that have unsubsidised farmers.
The Dairy Companies Association of NZ’s (DCANZ) executive director Kimberly Crewther says while other countries had propped up their farmers since the start of the pandemic the US was “way out in front” with the size of its support programmes. That was concerning given the growth trajectory the US dairy industry was currently on. “They have the potential to become the world’s largest dairy exporter, but that is going to come at a high cost to unsubsidised producers and not just exporters like NZ if that growth is coming from subsidies,” she said.
EU dumping has NZ Farmers lose $500m The dumping of subsidised skim milk powder (SMP) by the EU in 2018 is estimated to have cost New Zealand farmers $500m. In 2016 the EU moved nearly 25% of its production into storage before dumping it on the market in 2018 and 2019 at discounted prices. The purchasing of SMP by the EU was done with the intention of putting a floor price under the low EU farm gate milk prices. EU stocks – 378,000 tonnes in 2017 – 16% of global supply. Release of stocks onto the market had the estimated impact on prices:
2018 – SMP prices down by 3.6%
2019 – SMP prices down by 8.7%
US farm gate prices
2018 – SMP prices down by 1.7%
2019 – SMP prices down by 3.9%
The cost to NZ farmers is estimated at 30c per kg of milk solids in 2018 or 4.7% of the payout. The Eu was able to undercut competitors and increase its share of of the global SMP market from 30.6% in 2016 to 42.3% in 2019. New Zealand’s share fell from 23.5% to 16.3% over the same period.
Below is a type of question which has been quite popular in the last couple of exam sessions. I have changed the data from the original CIE question.
The table shows the values of selected macroeconomic variable over a two-year period.
What is the value of the multiplier?
A. 3 – B. 4 – C. 6 – D. 12
From the data both years are in equilibrium Year 1 NI = 3800 – Injections = 260+160+200 = 620 Withdrawals = 300+140+180 = 620 Year 2 NI = 4600 – Injections = 360+210+250 = 820 Withdrawals = 350+210+260 = 820
The increase in injections has been 200 but the increase in NI has been 800 (4600-3800) – therefore the multiplier is 4 – (4 x 200 = 800).
The Multiplier Consider a $300 million increase in business capital investment. This will set off a chain reaction of increases in expenditures. Firms who produce the capital goods that are ultimately purchased will experience an increase in their incomes. If they in turn, collectively spend about 3/5 of that additional income, then $180m will be added to the incomes of others. At this point, total income has grown by ($300m + (0.6 x $300m). The sum will continue to increase as the producers of the additional goods and services realise an increase in their incomes, of which they in turn spend 60% on even more goods and services. The increase in total income will then be ($300m + (0.6 x $300m) + (0.6 x $180m). The process can continue indefinitely. But each time, the additional rise in spending and income is a fraction of the previous addition to the circular flow.
The value of the multiplier can be found by the equation 1 ÷ (1-MPC) You can also use the following formula which represents a four sector economy 1 ÷ MPS+MRT+MPM
With the CIE multiple-choice paper next week, I went through an A2 multiple-choice question with some students on calculating the equilibrium level of income. There are two ways that it can be worked out. Here is the question:
In a closed economy with no government C = 30 + 0.8 Y and I = 50, where C is consumption, Y is income and I is investment.
What is the equilibrium level of income?
A 64 B 80 C 250 D 400
Below is the most common way of working the question out:
Y = C + I
Y = 30 + 0.8Y + 50
0.2Y = 80
Y = 400
Here is the other way that you should be able to work out the equilibrium
Remember: Savings = Income – Consumption
S = Y – C
S = Y – (a + cY)
S = Y – a – cY
S = -a + (1-c) Y
So if we put the figures into the equation you get:
With the A2 multiple-choice paper next week here are some notes on indifference curves – there is usually a question on either the income effect or substitution effect. The video below is particularly useful.
Income and Substitution Effects with Indifference Curves Any price change can be conveniently analysed into 2 separate effects – the INCOME EFFECT and the SUBSTITUTION EFFECT.
Income effect of a price change: – when there is a fall in the price of a product, the consumer receives a real income effect and is able to buy more of this and other products in spite of the fact that nominal income is unchanged. If the consumer buys more of the good when the price falls it is a Normalgood. If the consumer buys less of the good when the price falls it is seen as an Inferiorgood.
Substitution effect of a price change: – when there is a rise or fall in the price of a product, the consumer receives a decrease or an increase in the utility derived from each unit of money spent on the product and therefore rearranges demand to maximise utility. This is distinct from the income effect of a price change. For all products, the substitution effect is always positive such that a fall in price leads to an increase in demand as consumers realise an increase in the satisfaction they derive from each unit of money spent on the product.
Remember for normal goods, both the income and substitution effects are positive. But the income effect can be negative: if a negative income effect outweighs the positive substitution effect, this means that less is bought at a lower price and vice-versa. This good is therefore known as a Giffen good.
Giffen goods are generally regarded as goods of low quality which are important elements in the expenditure of those on low incomes. A good example is a basic food such as rice, which forms a significant part of the diet of the poor in many countries. The argument, not accepted by all economists, is that when the price of rice falls sufficiently individuals’ real income will rise to an extent that they will be able to afford more attractive substitutes such as fresh fruit or vegetables to makeup their diet and as a result they will actually purchase less rice even though its price has fallen.
Neoliberal policies of the last 30 years have seen income inequality grow and the collapse of consumer spending (C) the main driver of any domestic economy. There has been an increase in the proportion of income accruing to assets which worsens inequality in many countries. While China’s economy is synonymous with exports, private consumption has been the largest component of Chinese GDP growth since 2014. With household spending at 39% of GDP in 2018, compared with nearer 70% for more developed economies such as the U.S. and the U.K., it also has considerable potential for further growth. Remember that Aggregate Demand = C+I+G+(X-M).
At the annual planning meeting last month China decided to focus on expanding domestic demand and achieving a major breakthroughs in core technologies. President Xi Jinping’s administration is looking at being self-sufficient in a range of technologies that have in the past been dominated by US firms. An obvious reason for the switch to domestic consumers is that with COVID-19 there is increasing instability and uncertainty around the international environment. A temporarily suspended trade war with the US has emphasised the importance of ending its dependence on foreign technology supplies. President Xi Jinping outlined a new dual circulation economic strategy which came about with the potential decoupling with the US and deglobalisation which would negatively impact the demand for Chinese exports. The dual circulation economic strategy consists of:
The importance of strengthening domestic demand
Technological innovation over closer integration with the outside world
Growth targets China has set targets for economic growth in its 5 year plans – this is its 14th 5 year plan. It is expected that annual average growth to be around 5% down from previous years where it was expected to be 6.5% – 7.5%.
Final thought China needs a lot more domestic consumption as newly produced goods will just become surplus to requirements. This will also mean increased levels of corporate debt.