Tag Archives: Greece

If only Greece owned Apple

Apple Greece bailoutA HT to colleague David Parr for this piece from The Sydney Morning Herald. Apple are currently worth $US194 billion in cash and securities which equates to €178 billion. This means that Apple have enough to cover the €86 billion Greek bailout deal struck earlier in the week twice over — with a cool €6 billion still left over to maybe buy an island or a port. If Apple were a country, it’d be the 55th richest country in the world.

According to the World Bank’s most recent data on national wealth, Apple is now worth more than the following countries:

Belarus – worth $467 billion
El Salvadore – worth $364 billion
Guatemala – worth $548 billion
Iceland – worth – $268 billlion
Jamaica – worth $211 billion
Kenya – worth $366 billion
Luxembourg – worth $419 billion
Mongolia – worth $34 billion
Nepal – worth $151 billion
Nicaragua – worth $101 billion
Sri Lanka – worth $424 billion
Tunisia – worth $475 billion

IMF says Greece needs more debt relief.

The IMF has stated that Greece needs far more debt relief than European governments have been willing to contemplate so far, as fractious parties in Athens prepared to vote on a sweeping austerity package demanded by their lenders. Paul Mason from Channel 4 in the UK explains the options very well in the video below.

Greece – the problems started with the euro-entry exam in 2000

When Greece went through euro-zone entry exam in 2000 it is said that it cheated on its deficit figures. Greece was able to enter the currency bloc after claiming its deficit was less than 1% of GDP, well within the bloc’s 3% threshold. EU reports have since revealed Greece’s budget hasn’t been within the 3% limit a single year since its accession. Below is a video from RealNews which explains the background to the present crisis. Worth a look

What would happen if there was a Grexit?

The Greeks vote on Sunday whether to accept a June 25 offer from the International Monetary Fund, European Union and the European Central Bank (collectively known as “the Troika”) to provide Greece with desperately needed bailout money. In exchange, the Troika demanded that Greece implement a list of tax increases, spending cuts, and economic reforms. If there is a no vote then there could be the following scenario.

Negatives
* Overnight the Greek authorities would have to circulate a new currency (most likely the Drachma)
* The Drachma would depreciate against the Euro – according to some analysts this would increase Greek debt from the current level of 175% to 230% of GDP.
* Interest rates would increase causing businesses to go bankrupt – some have indicated that this would be around 50% of businesses
* The risk of a run on the banks would mean that the monetary authorities would have to introduce controls on money flows – especially abroad.
* Social unrest would no doubt escalate in the short-term and many Greeks will leave the country (if they can afford it).
* The Greek government would find it difficult to raise funds from overseas as investors become more prudent and see Greek bonds as an even bigger risk than before.
* A devaluation will would do nothing to change Greece’s structural problems.
* The euro will lose credibility in the long run and its weaker members will be exposed to bank runs which will ultimately extinguish any chance of a recovery.

Positives
* A weaker currency would make Greek exports a lot cheaper and may resurrect the textile industry that collapsed a few years ago.
* However the biggest benefit would be the tourism industry where holidays would become very cheap relative to similar destinations in Europe.
* The Greek government could keep printing money to finance the promises made Alexis Tsipras’ government – maybe an inflationary threat.
* Interest rates would no longer be determined by the ECB and a more expansionary monetary policy could be implemented by Greek authorities to tackle the downturn.

We’ve been here before as Jeff Sachs mentioned in his piece from Project Syndicate.

Almost a century ago, at World War I’s end, John Maynard Keynes offered a warning that holds great relevance today. Then, as now, creditor countries (mainly the US) were demanding that deeply indebted countries make good on their debts. Keynes knew that a tragedy was in the making.

“Will the discontented peoples of Europe be willing for a generation to come so to order their lives that an appreciable part of their daily produce may be available to meet a foreign payment?” he asked in The Economic Consequences of the Peace. “In short, I do not believe that any of these tributes will continue to be paid, at the best, for more than a few years.”

The Greek government is right to have drawn the line. It has a responsibility to its citizens. The real choice, after all, lies not with Greece, but with Europe.

Below is a chart from Bloomberg Business explaining the outcomes.
Greek referendum

Greek Crisis – A game of chicken

Chicken gameThe negotiations between Greece and the Eurozone financial chiefs represent a typical game of ‘Chicken’. Chicken readily translates into an abstract game. Strictly speaking game theory’s chicken dilemma occurs at the last possible moment of a game of highway chicken. Each driver has calculated his reaction time and his car’s turning radius, which is assumed to be the same in both cars. There comes a time when each driver must decide to either swerve or keep going straight towards the other car. This decision is irrevocable and must be made in ignorance of the other driver’s decision. There is no time for one driver’s last-minute decision to influence the other driver’s decision. In its simulations, life or death simplicity, chicken is one of the purest examples of John von Neumann’s concept of a game. The way players rank outcomes in highway chicken is obvious. The worst scenario is for both players not to swerve – they crash and both are killed. The best thing that can happen is for you to keep driving straight letting the other driver swerving. The cooperative outcome is not so bad as both drivers are still alive although no one can call the other chicken.

As in the game of Chicken, both Greece and the Eurozone have the option to make concessions (Swerve) or hold firm in negotiations (Drive Straight). As with most negotiations, the best outcome for a party is to stand their ground while the other party makes the concessions. However, as both parties want this outcome, this raises the possibility of both sides holding firm and no settlement being reached. In the Greek-Eurozone crisis, this would mean a Greek default and the associated consequences that would ensue for the rest of the Eurozone.

Fortunately there is a third outcome that can prevail in Chicken – both parties can swerve their car at the same time. If both sides are willing to make concessions, then the second best outcome in this game can be attained for everyone. This co-operative outcome could be reached if the Eurozone extended further concessions to Greece, while Greece made binding promises to implement meaningful reforms to get their economy back on track.

However this is unlikely as each player achieves their best outcome by doing the opposite of their opponent. For example, if Greece believes the Eurozone will make concessions, it will achieve the best outcome by standing firm; if it believes the Eurozone will stand firm in negotiations, it’s best option is to make concessions to avoid the dire consequences of a full-blown default.

Chicken - Greece Germany

From the beginning of June until the end of December Greece needs to find another EUR28bn in total. After that point repayments drop off – one reason why Greece’s creditors are keen to ensure new reforms are enacted ASAP.
The inference however is clear: Greece won’t make it that far without a new deal. Greece is waiting on further funding from the IMF and the ECB (EUR 7.2bn) in order to meet some of these payments, but with both sides digging in, it isn’t a given that Greece will receive the funds. See graph below.

Greece repayments

Sources: NAB Australian Markets Weekly, Christoph Schumacher Massey University, Open Economy – Open minded Economics, Prisoner’s Dilemma – William Poundstone

Syriza’s rescue programme for Greece “ pure Keynesian policies”

A number of articles from The New Yorker magazine have outlined the problems facing Greece’s anti-austerity party Syriza. The party came to power on the election promise of reducing Greece’s debt burden and to liberate Greece from the Troika – the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission. However the extension recently granted to Greece will take place only within the framework of the existing arrangement. The budgetary targets for 2015 and 2016 have kept the economy stuck in recession.

* the Greek economy has contracted by 30% since 2008.
* 25% of the workforce are officially unemployed
* 50% of those under 24 years of age are unemployed
* 40% of Greek children live below the poverty line.

Money has been flowing out of the economy leaving the banking system on the verge of collapse see graphic from The Economist.

As with the Keynesian doctrine, Syriza’s solution in to create effective demand by pumping money into the system. One economics professor at the University of Athens called it “pure Keynesian policies. The big question is where will the money come from although some seem to think that it can raise revenue from tackling corruption and tax evasion. The latter is widespread in Greece amongst the upper-middle class and the very rich – the top-most bracket of households and businesses are responsible for 80% of the total tax debt owed to the government.

Greece’s creditors were mostly European banks, which had, in part, used public bailout money following the 2008 credit crunch to scoop up Greek bonds. For example, French and German banks were on the books for thirty-one and twenty-three billion euros, respectively. The troika stepped in during the spring of 2010, and again in 2012, to orchestrate bailouts of the Greek government, offering two hundred and forty billion euros in loans in exchange for a drastic reduction in government spending and other measures to make the Greek economy more competitive. Source: New Yorker

Grexit
The conventional wisdom is that returning to the drachma would be a catastrophe for Greece. There are pros and cons to this decision – the following would be concerns about returning to the drachma:
* An immediate devaluation;
* The value of savings would tumble;
* The price of imported goods would soar.

However on the positive side of things you would get the following:
* Greek exports would become cheaper
* Labour costs even more competitive.
* Tourism would likely boom.
* Regaining control of its monetary and fiscal policy for the first time since 2001

It would give Greece the chance to deal with its economic woes. Other countries that have endured sudden devaluations have often found that long-term gain outweighs short-term pain. When Argentina defaulted and devalued the peso, in 2001, months of economic chaos were followed by years of rapid growth. Iceland had a similar experience after the financial crisis. The Greek situation would entail an entirely new currency rather than just a devaluation.
This conflict is as much about the ideology of austerity and whether smaller countries will have a meaningful say in their own economic fate. However one needs look back in history to remember that in debt-saddled Weimar German, humiliation and dispossession festered until it a gave rise to the Nazi party. Greece’s neo-nazi party won the third greatest number of parliament seats in the last election.

Greek Bonds

Greece's problem is insolvency not liquidity shortfall.

This is an interesting video clip from the RT Network featuring Max Keiser. Everyone knows Greece is insolvent but no-one has ever stated it officially. Some have suggested that the issue is a liquidity shortfall and lending it more money will help Greece meet its current debt service obligations and fund structural reforms that will lead to renewed growth and increased income, enabling to meet its obligations in the future. However Yanis Varoufakis, current Finance Minister of Greece, disagrese with this interpretation. He believes that Greece will never recover. The bailout programme locks it into a debt deflationary spiral which simultaneously reduces its income and increases its debt burden. Continuing to accept more loans in order to meet debt service obligations only makes matters worse.